the philosophy of mind was one of the triumphs of the new analytic philosophy.
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2) The central job of Cognitive Psychology is to identify this abstract function that we are all (more or less) computing.
3) The central job of AI research is to create novel physical realizations of salient parts of, and ultimately all of, the abstract function we are all (more or less) computing. 1 Just to remind, a function is a set of input/output pairs, such that for each possible input, there is assigned a unique output. Such sets can have infinitely many input/output pairs, and the relations between the inputs and outputs can display extraordinary levels of complexity. The characterization proposed in 1) is thus in no sense demeaning to cognitive creatures. It requires only that the relevant function be computable, i.e., that the proper output for any given input can be recursively generated by a finite system, such as a brain, in a finite time.
4)
Folk Psychology -our common-sense conception of the causal structure of cognitive activity --already embodies a crude and partial representation of the function we are all (more or less) computing.
5)
The reduction of Folk Psychology (indeed, any Psychology) to the neuroscience of human brains is twice impossible, because: i) the relevant function is computable in a potentially infinite variety of ways, not just in the way that humans happen to do it, and ii) such diverse computational procedures are in any case realizable in a potential infinity of distinct physical substrates, not just in the specifically human biological substrate. Accordingly, to reduce the categories of Folk Psychology to the idiosyncratic procedures and mechanisms of specifically human brain activity would be to exclude, from the domain of genuine cognitive agents, the endless variety of other realizations of the characteristic function (see point 1) that we are all computing. The kind-terms of Psychology must thus be functionally rather than naturalistically or reductively defined.
6) Empirical research into the microstructure and microactivities of human and
animal brains is entirely legitimate (for certainly we do wish to know how the sought-after function is realized in our own idiosyncratic case). But it is a very poor research strategy for recovering the global function itself, whose structure will be more instructively revealed in the situated molar-level behavior of the entire creature 7) Points 5) and 6) jointly require us to respect and defend the methodological autonomy of Cognitive Psychology, relative to such lower-level sciences as brain anatomy, brain physiology, and biochemistry. Cognitive Psychology is picking up on its own laws at its own level of physical complexity.
Thus the familiar and collectively compelling elements of a highly influential philosophical position. Perhaps astonishingly, the position is decisively mistaken in all seven of the elements just listed. Or so, at least, I shall argue in what follows.
I. SOME UNEXPECTED LESSONS FROM NEUROBIOLOGY
The classical or 'program-writing' research tradition in AI was one highly promising expression of the Functionalist view just outlined. But by the early 1980s, that research program had hit the wall with an audible thud. Despite the development of CPUs with increasingly fabulous clock speeds (even desk-top machines now top 10 9 Hz), despite ever-expanding memory capacities (even desk-top machines now boast over 10 10 bytes), despite blistering internal signal conduction velocities (close to the speed of light), and despite the continuing a priori assurance (grounded in the Church-Turing Thesis) that a Universal Turing
Machine could, in principle, compute any computable function whatever, programmed computers in fact performed very poorly relative to their biological counterparts, at least on a wide variety of typical cognitive tasks.
The problem was not that there was any well-defined class of cognitive tasks that programmed digital computers proved utterly unable to even begin to simulate. The problem was rather that equal increments of progress toward more realistic cognitive simulations proved to require the commitment of exponentially increasing resources in memory capacity, computational speed, and program complexity. Moreover, even when sufficient memory capacity was made available to cover all of the empirical contingencies that real cognition is prepared to encounter, a principled way of retrieving, from that vast store, all and only the currently relevant information proved entirely elusive. As the memories were made larger, the retrieval problem got worse. Accordingly, as actual cognitive performance approached the levels displayed by biological brains (and in many cases they did), the time taken for the machines to produce the desired performance expanded to ridiculous lengths. A programmed machine took minutes or hours to do what a biological brain could do in a fraction of a second.
At the time, this was deeply puzzling, because no process in the brain had a 'clock frequency' higher than perhaps 100 Hz, and because typical signal conduction velocities within the brain are no greater than a human bicycle rider:
perhaps 10 m/sec. In the respects at issue, this puts the biological brain at an 
IV. MULTIPLE REALIZATION: ON THE ALLEGED IMPOSSIBILITY OF AN INTERTHEORETIC REDUCTION FOR ANY MOLAR-LEVEL PSYCHOLOGY
Conceivably, the preceding estimate of Folk Psychology is too harsh.
Perhaps its presumptive failure to mesh with the vector-coding / vector-processing story of brain activity reflects only the fact that Folk Psychology is a molar-level portrait of cognitive activity, a portrait that picks up on laws and categories at a level of description far above the details of neuroanatomy and neurophysiology, a portrait that should not be expected to reduce to any such lower level of scientific theory. As many will argue, that reductive demand should not be imposed on Folk Psychology -nor on any potential replacement Cognitive Psychology either (a replacement drawn, perhaps, from future molar-level research). For, it will be said, Psychology addresses law-like regularities at its own level of description.
These regularities are no doubt implemented in the underlying 'hardware' of the brain, but they need not be reducible to a theory of that hardware. What fuels the inference is the assumption that different material substrates -such as mammalian biology, invertebrate biology, extraterrestrial biology, semiconductor electronics, interferometric photonics, computational hydrology, and so on -will be governed by different families of physical laws.
But this needn't be so. Let me illustrate with three salient and instructive examples. Sound is a molar-level phenomenon. That is to say, it can be displayed only where there exists a large number of microscopic particles interacting in certain ways. And it, too, is a phenomenon that is multiply realized: in the Earth's highly peculiar atmosphere, in a gas of any molecular constitution, in a liquid of any molecular constitution, and in a solid of any molecular constitution.
Sound propagates in any and all of these media. And yet sound is identical with, is smoothly reducible to, compression waves as propagated in any of these highly diverse media. For the underlying physical laws that bring the phenomenon of sound into the embrace of mechanical phenomena generally are indifferent to the peculiar molecules that make up the conducting medium, and to their collective status as a gas, liquid, or solid. What matters is that, collectively those particles form an elastic medium that allows energy to be transmitted over long distances while the elements of the transmitting medium merely oscillate back and forth a comparatively tiny distance in the direction of energy transmission. To put it bluntly, the very same laws of wave propagation in an elastic medium cover all of the diverse cases at issue. Idiosyncratic features such as the velocity of wave propagation may indeed depend upon the details of the conducting medium (such as the mass of its molecules, and whether they form a gas, liquid, or solid). But the various high-level laws of acoustics (such as v = λϖ, and other laws concerning the reflective and refractive behaviors of sound generally) reduce to the very same mechanical laws in all of these diverse cases. A diversity of material substrates here does not entail diversity in the underlying laws that govern those diverse substrates. Accordingly, acoustics is not an 'autonomous science,' devoted to finding laws and ontological categories at its 'own level of description.' It is but one chapter in the broader mechanics of elastic media.
Temperature, also, is a molar level phenomenon. And it, too, is a phenomenon that is multiply realized: in the Earth's atmosphere, or in any atmosphere, or indeed, in a gas of any molecular constitution whatever, either pure or mixed. For the temperature of a gas is identical with, is reducible to, the mean level of kinetic energy of the molecules that make up that gas. Here again, the underlying laws of motion (Newton's laws) that govern the behavior of, and the interactions of, the molecules involved are the very same for every kind of molecule that might be involved. Those laws are simply indifferent to the shape, or the mass, or the chemical makeup of whatever molecules happen to constitute the gas in question. Idiosyncratic details, such as the velocity of dispersion of an unconfined gas, will indeed depend on such details as molecular mass. But the laws of classical thermodymanics (such as the Ideal Gas Law, PV = µRT) reduce to the same set of underlying mechanical laws whatever the molecular makeup of the gas in question. Once again, a diversity of material substrates does not entail diversity in the underlying laws that govern those diverse substances.
Accordingly, classical thermodynamics is not an 'autonomous science,' devoted to finding laws and ontological categories at its 'own level of description.' Its reduction to statistical mechanics is a staple of undergraduate physics texts.
For a third example, a dipole magnetic field --as instanced in the simple rectangular bar-magnet that one uses to pick up scattered thumb-tacks --constitutes a molar-level phenomenon, but such dipole magnetic fields are realizable in a variety of distinct metals and materials. Pure iron is the most familiar substrate, but sundry alloys (such as aluminum + nickel + cobalt) will also support such a field, as will certain metal/ceramic mixtures. Indeed, any substrate that somehow involves charged particles moving in mutually aligned circles (such as a tightly wound current-carrying coil of copper wire) will support a dipole magnetic field. For the simple laws that describe the shape and causal provide an alternative pattern -a pattern whereby molar-level theories that record genuine high-level regularities across diverse material substrates will typically find a successful reduction to some underlying and highly general physical laws, laws that are simply blind to the idiosyncratic and irrelevant differences that happen to distinguish the several substrates. We have just seen this happen in three unproblematic cases. And there are, I repeat, many more. For a fifth example, consider Kepler's three laws of planetary motion, valid for planets of highly diverse material constitution. All three of those laws are reducible to Newton's particle mechanics plus his Universal Law of Gravitation. For a sixth example, consider the science of aerodynamics: the theory of creatures or machines that are capable of flight. Multiple realizability is an obvious feature of this domain: think of seagulls, hummingbirds, bats, dragonflies, wooden airplanes, metal airplanes, helicopters, and so on. And yet their shared molar behavior is ultimately owed to the fact that they all contrive to accelerate ambient air more-or-less continuously downwards, which activity yields, by Newton's (substrate-neutral) third law, a reactive upwards force that is more-or-less continuously equal to the task of keeping them aloft. For a seventh example, consider the closely similar chemical and electrical behaviors of the distinct elements within a given chemical 'family,' those that constitute one vertical column of the Periodic Table ( e.g., the metals, or, the noble gases). Here the shared molar-level chemical regularities, across a given family of elements, are explained in terms of shared valence-electronshell structures across the distinct types of atoms within that family. For an eighth example, one rather closer to the case of cognitive creatures, consider the molar behavior of any radio, TV, or music player. Despite the great variety of metal and semiconductor substrates that will instantiate the required circuits for signal detection, amplification, and presentation, the behavior of all such devices is reducible to the same set of electrodynamical laws concerning resistances, capacitances, and inductances, laws blind to the material diversity of the substrates that a given manufacturer may choose to employ. As we see from such examples, this general reductive pattern, across substrate diversity, is quite robust. For an illuminating discussion, see Strevens, M., Bigger than
On this alternative logical and historical pattern, legitimate molar-level theories that comprehend genuine natural kinds will thus be positively expected to find some such intertheoretic reduction. For if they eventually prove not to be thus reducible, we will have to reconsider the initial presumption that the molarlevel theory really does embrace genuine high-level natural kinds governed by genuine high-level explanatory laws. The 'unitary' account that the molar theory seemed to provide, across the diverse substrates, might then have to be judged an accidental or a false unity. And its supposedly law-like generalizations will thus turn out to be accidental generalizations of some sort, generalizations that are empty of real explanatory and predictive power. Accordingly, if we expect our beloved Folk Psychology, or any Psychology, to provide an accurate, naturalkind-embracing, genuinely nomological and explanatory account of the molarlevel cognitive operations and behavior of humans, other mammals, human-like aliens, and human-like artificial automata, then we had better hope that there exist highly general underlying laws -laws blind to the material differences between all of these diverse creatures -which serve collectively to explain, and thus to reduce, the categories and laws of Psychology. say, what are the chances that the case of Psychology will turn out to be an instance of the alternative and overtly reductive pattern of development explored in the preceding pages, and in the examples of footnote 7? Well, they are certainly not zero. For there are at least two low-level theories that have sufficient generality to embrace all of the diverse material realizations of cognitive activity listed in the preceding paragraph, and that also hold promise for explaining at least some of the activities comprehended by Psychology. Let us take a look at them.
V. SOME REDUCTIVE POSSIBILITIES FOR MOLAR-LEVEL PSYCHOLOGY
The first possible framework equal to the task of comprehending all of the diverse material realizations envisioned for cognitive systems is Nonequilibrium Thermodynamics. Distinct from the more familiar (near-equilibrium) statistical thermodynamics discussed earlier, this is the general framework for describing the laws of energy and information flow in partially-closed physical systems that are, and remain, very far away from energetic equilibrium. This is the framework, still in its developmental infancy, that already unites and illuminates all biological phenomena, whatever their physical constitution. The basic idea, first outlined half a century ago by the physicist, Erwin Schrodinger, 7 is that any living organism is a highly improbable physical structure whose natural behavior -if it is located in a suitable flow of ambient energy --serves to exploit whatever structure it already contains so as to produce additional physical structure. It grows, or it repairs itself, or it reproduces. Such an interest-bearing investment 8 is possible only when the system is situated so as to exploit an energy flux that begins with energy from a very low-entropy state 9 , energy that is then progressively dissipated into energy at a much higher entropy state. The living physical system 'steals' some of the initial low-entropy energy as that energy courses through it, and it then incorporates that energy in the form of additional (and improbable) physical structure. The low-entropy energy source for our terrestrial environment is ultimately the Sun, radiating at a black-body temperature of roughly 4000°K (i.e. at rather short wavelengths). And the ultimate high-entropy energy sink is the surrounding background of empty space, radiating at a black-body temperature of about 3°K (i.e., at very long wavelengths). In between lies the biosphere at a temperature around 293°K.
Without such a concentrated or low-entropy energy source 'above' us, and such a dissipated high-entropy energy sink 'below' us, nothing alive could hope to remain alive. Indeed, nothing of any biological interest -that is, no extremely improbable physical structures with complex metabolic pathways --could ever have evolved in the first place.
Those that have evolved are thus instant testament to the existence of such a complexity-inducing ambient energetic waterfall -a constant flow from the Sun, through us, and into the cold abyss beyond. Moreover, any individual of any 7 E. Schrodinger, "What is Life?" (Cambridge U.P., 1944). 8 Note well the economic metaphor here deployed. Its aptness will come up again shortly. 9 Entropy is a measure of how chaotically scattered or dissipated an amount of energy happens to be, a measure of how unavailable it is to do any concerted work. By contrast, a low-entropy state implies that the relevant energy is highly 'concentrated' and available to do work.
species also embodies, in its typical structural details, extraordinary amounts of information about the peculiar environmental niche in which it thrives. For no individual could be expected to have the specific physical structure it has unless the environment in which it thrives has a comparably specific physical and dynamical profile. For, once again, eons of evolutionary pressures have made the former exquisitely 'tuned' to the latter, functionally and metabolically speaking. I briefly floated this possible construal of cognitive creatures some twentyfive years ago, in the closing paragraphs of my 1979 book, 10 and again, in slightly more detail, in a 1982 paper. 11 Those accounts of cognition, and that of the preceding two paragraphs, may well be dismissed as mere hand-waving speculation, unless we can provide an account of how brains actually process, and incorporate into their internal structure, ambient information.
In the salient case of biological metabolisms, we do indeed possess such a non-handwaving account. We know how DNA embodies information. We know how that information is read out by RNA in order to synthesize various protein molecules. We know how those protein molecules catalyze certain metabolic reactions, and sequences of such reactions. We know how those reaction-chains create new biological molecules that form additional biological structures. We know how those structures collectively steer ambient energy and materials along paths that sustain and amplify the organism at issue. The nonequilibrium thermodynamical portrait of living things is therefore not just a philosophical guess. It is a highly general reductive framework that brings real illumination to biological processes, across a wide diversity of chemical substrates.
Twenty-five years ago, I must own, the nonequilibrium thermodynamical portrait of cognitive activity was a merely philosophical guess -a hesitant extrapolation from the thermodynamic portrait of living things just explored. manages to do it. We now understand, for example, how the activation space of a large population of neurons can come to embody a structured system of categorical prototypes -that is, a meaningful conceptual framework. We now understand how those prototype-points in such a background neuronal activation space can be selectively activated by sensory inputs. That is, we understand how a brain can interpret its sensory experience in terms of its acquired conceptual framework. We now understand how prototypical motor behaviors can be represented as prototypical activation-trajectories in motor-neuron activation space. That is, we have some understanding of how complex motor skills are embodied. And we know how such unfolding trajectories can actually generate the relevant motor behaviors in the body's limb and muscle systems. In sum, we
can now see cognitive activity as we have never seen it before. Whether we are seeing it correctly, only time will tell. But a fertile vision is already being explored. What this means is that the celebrated element 5) of the functionalist manifesto is not just naively argued. In fact, it is almost certainly false.
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VI. WHAT DOES NOT UNITE THE CLASS OF COGNITIVE
CREATURES
On the vector/matrix story explored above, what carries the burden of any creature's acquired background knowledge, of the world's general and enduring structure, is the specific configuration of the billions or trillions of synaptic connections that variously intervene between the brain's many distinct neuronal coding populations. It is these variously weighted excitatory or inhibitory 13 Allow me a closing remark on Fodor's 1974 parade case of a molar-level natural science for which reductive aspirations are supposed to be clearly foolish, namely Economics. The supporting argument then appealed to the multiple realizability of currency systems -such as shell currency, coin currency, paper currency, electronic currency, and so on. We can all agree that Economics is not going to be reducible to the chemistry of wood-fiber, or to the physics of copper and gold. But all of this is now visibly beside the point. For we can now appreciate that Economics is the study of the metabolisms of superorganisms, a phenomenon that once again falls firmly within the province of nonequilibrium thermodynamics, a science whose laws are blind to such implementational details. A national economy, after all, embodies a flow of both energy and materials: it creates real physical and organizational structures, and it dissipates vast amounts of (initially low-entropy) energy in the process. It is too soon to insist that Economics will indeed elements that constitute the brain's principal memory store, and also its principal means of computation. One and the same system simultaneously serves both functions No two people, however, display the same configuration of synaptic connections and synaptic weights. Each human brain boasts roughly 10 14 synaptic connections, the overwhelming majority of which are established postnatally in response to a lived experience that is unique to each individual. Since we experience a common world that does display enduring features, each of us ends up with a family of sculpted activation-spaces whose structure is similar to the structure of other people's activation spaces, at least if they are members of the same culture. But genuine identity is too much to ask for. We may all agree that the vector/matrix system found in each individual is computing a function of some fabulously complex sort. But no two people on the planet will be computing exactly the same function, for no two people share the same matrix of synaptic connections.
Very well, but surely they will be computing similar functions? Indeed What is it, then, that unites us? Ironically, it appears to be the abstract form of our hardware that unites us! We are, all of us on the preceding list, massively parallel vector-processors whose ever-active vector-transforming matrices (our trillions of synaptic connections) are slowly updated or instructed by a procedure that filters information from a low-entropy flux of energy from our sensory peripheries. This computational arrangement has prodigious advantages over the serial architecture deployed in classical (von Neumann) computers -in its speed of computation, in its graceful tolerance of scattered component failures, and in its fast retrieval of relevant information. This alternative computational template is sufficiently virtuous to make it a likely evolutionary choice on any planet that develops life, not just on Earth, and to make it a compelling technological choice for any future attempts at constructing artificial intelligence as well.
Accordingly, element 1) of the original functionalist manifesto is almost certainly a mistake -indeed, a monumental mistake. The cognitive creatures on this planet are computing a bewildering variety of very different functions, but they are all using fundamentally similar computational 'hardwares' in order to do it. On this fundamental point, classical functionalism had things exactly backwards.
Element 2) must therefore be rejected as well. If our alternative portrait of cognition is even roughly correct, the central job of Cognitive Psychology is to explore how it is that terrestrial brains are able compute the extraordinary variety of functions displayed in diverse species of cognitive creature. This must be an empirical undertaking, one sensitive to the idiosyncrasies of nonhuman nervous systems. Accordingly, element 3) must be rethought along the same lines. The central job of AI research is not just to explore the construction of artificial vector-processing systems that compute the same function that some species of animal is already computing. A central part of its job will be to explore instead the pregnant potential of such artificial systems for computing functions -for pursuing cognitive activities -that no terrestrial creature has yet pursued or ever will pursue. Large-scale electronic realizations of our vector/matrix-style of computational resources will explore entirely new horizons for information processing and world-representation, and, being electronic, they will do it roughly a million times faster than biological creatures can ever hope to do it (because the speed of signal conduction in a copper wire is close to the speed of light). The enterprise of Artificial Intelligence thus has a dazzling future, but not because classical functionalism launched it in the right direction.
Indeed, it launched the enterprise in a most unfortunate direction.
Element 6) provided a twisted rationale for mostly ignoring the empirical or experimental neurosciences, and for ignoring the early theoretical work that attempted to model the activities of large numbers of interconnected neurons.
Worse still, element 7) celebrated this deliberate disconnection with an illconceived positive portrait of Cognitive Psychology and Artificial Intelligence as 'methodologically autonomous sciences.' In retrospect, this was unwise, despite the genuinely clever contributions of a great many gifted researchers. For it served to insulate the relevant research from exactly the empirical information that promised the most interesting and authoritative constraints on whatever models were put up for evaluation. The result was almost half a century of misdirected research.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
The seven elements of our opening functionalist manifesto, all seven of them, appear to be false -not just inadequately argued for, but outright false. In closing, it is worth pointing out that two prominent background assumptions of the functionalist program have not been denied in the preceding critique. The first assumption is that cognitive creatures are indeed engaged in computing complex functions of some sort or other. And the second is that these computational activities, whatever they are, can be realized in a diversity of physical substrates. These assumptions are presumably as true, and as important, as they ever were. But in the present intellectual environment, those same two assumptions now pull our imaginations in entirely new directions. The first assumption motivates the brain-centered research program known as
Computational Neurobiology. And the second assumption motivates the development of alternative physical realizations (presumably electronic or photonic) --not of our 'software' (strictly speaking, we don't have any!), but --of the massively parallel, vector-processing structure of our biological hardware. Let us hope that this second wave of research will be more revealing, and less selfblinkered, than the functionalist-inspired wave that preceded it.
